










REGULATING NATIONAL FIRMS 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2209 
CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 
FEBRUARY 2008 
 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




REGULATING NATIONAL FIRMS 





We consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence 
the production of national firms but they incur in a positive cost of public funds. First, we 
show that market integration is welfare improving if and only if the efficiency gains 
compensate for the negative public finance effect (related to business stealing). We also show 
that supranational competition can have very different consequences on the rent seeking 
behaviour of firms, depending on cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we 
characterize the global optimum and show how it can be sustained in a decentralized 
bargaining solution. 
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are mine.  1 Introduction
Historically, monopoly regulation has been a response to market failures, such as increasing
returns to scale and externalities. In most countries, government intervention took the form of
the creation of public monopolies. More recently, the poor performance of public enterprises,
associated with soft budget constraints and lack of incentives, has motivated widespread reforms
introducing partial privatization and liberalization. These interventions were aimed to stimu-
late productivity and to decrease prices through the creation a more competitive environment.
Recent econometric works on privatization give mixed results about the eﬀects on eﬃciency and
prices.1 For liberalization, there is some evidence it increases productive eﬃciency, but the ef-
fect on prices is still debated.2 One of the problems is that, even after liberalization, in all these
industries high concentration persists, due to residual economies of scale and barriers to entry.
In markets where the national leaders stay dominant, the competitive pressure can be increased
through market integration. When the boundaries of the market are enlarged, competition can
take place even if the eﬃcient scale of the ﬁrm is large. For instance, the process of economic
integration in the European Union has fostered competition in regulated markets. Firms are
allowed to provide services in all member states and exclusion of competitors from other mem-
ber States is no longer permitted. However, regulated industries usually provide services of
general interest which have special treatment under the law. Member States are free to impose
obligations to the ﬁrms and to oﬀer compensation for that, in particular for the provision of
universal service. It is common to ﬁnd markets in which the former monopoly is subject to ex
ante regulation, in which the government inﬂuences the market behavior of the ﬁrm (public or
regulated) and some transfers are paid in order to preserve the universality of the service. In
this context, the introduction of competition and the removal of barriers to trade raise special
issues, which are the object of our analysis. A crucial point is that market integration removes
barriers to trade, while regulation acts at the national level. On the one hand, competition
reduces the ability of the regulator to control the national market and to induce the preferred
Ramsey-type tariﬀs. On the other hand, integration can increase national welfare through the
foreign proﬁts of the national ﬁrm and in some cases it also helps to reduce the rent captured
by regulated ﬁrms.
There are several examples of regulated markets which have been progressively exposed to
1For instance, Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), studying reforms in telecommunications, ﬁnd no evidence that
the change in ownership structure matters. Domah and Pollit (2001) and Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick (2002),
studying the reforms in electricity in developed and developing countries respectively, reject the hypothesis that
privatization per se leads to increasing eﬃciency or decreasing prices.
2The idea that the eﬃciency gains related to reforms are not necessarily transmitted into price have been
conﬁrmed by several empirical works on the liberalization of the electricity sector. For instance, the panel data
analysis of Green and Newbery (1998), Domah and Pollit (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2003) ﬁnd that reforms
have been associated with increasing prices.
2competition and in particular to foreign competition.3 In telecommunications, the process of
liberalization and market integration is probably the most advanced. The bigger providers op-
erate at the European level and they have reciprocally challenged their monopoly position in
the home country. Some of the main players are public or mixed-public ﬁrms, others are com-
pletely privatized ﬁrms. For instance, in the UK, British Telecom has been fully privatized from
1987. In continental Europe the situation is diﬀerent. In September 2004, French State still
held 42.2 percent of the capital of France Telecom and around 80 percent of the workers were
civil servants (Berne and Pogorel, 2004). Similarly, the German operator Deutsche Telecom is
only partially privatized. Even if the privatization process goes on, the role of governments in
this industry will remain important because of universal service obligations and price regula-
tion. Moreover, direct government intervention seems to be the rule in case of crisis, sometime
conﬂicting with the general antitrust and non discrimination policies. An example is the inter-
vention of the French government in favor of France Telecom, which has been under scrutiny
of the EU Commission under the legislation on State aids. Other regulated industries are by
far less competitive than telecommunications, but still market integration and the removal of
barriers to trade put some competitive pressure on the incumbents. An example is postal ser-
vice. Here the extent of eﬀective competition is lower, but eﬀorts are made at the EU level to
increase market integration. As a reaction, in the last years, many UPS have bought private
parcels operators to consolidate their presence in other member states. In the same way, energy
markets are progressively integrated. Market integration is developed in Northern countries,
independently of the more general process of integration at the EU level. Norway and Sweden
have liberalized their markets, allowing neighbor operators to enter the national market. The
incumbent public monopolies have been privatize to a very small extent, but foreign competitors
are allowed to serve the market. In the same way, European directives promote the formation
of an European market for energy through liberalization and interconnection. The situation
is similar for transports. In this case, every national leader has market power in its country.
For railways, public ownership and government funding are widespread, due to the social value
of the industry and the persistent economies of scale. For this reason, the industry is quasi-
monopolistic in most of the countries. Nevertheless, competition is allowed and the European
institutions are trying to develop a common transport policy for the integrated market. For
airlines, the process of privatization is more pervasive. However, government direct partici-
pation remains. For instance, the French government controls 44 percent of Airfrance, which
represents 81 percent of the merged entity Airfrance-KLM. Moreover, the recent crisis of the
industry in the early 2000s has shown that, direct government intervention takes place whenever
the national carrier encounters a major threat. Even in the United States, government oﬃcers
3Most of the regulated industries are network industries. In the present paper we focus on competitive issues
neglecting interconnection problems. This is equivalent to assuming that interconnection is priced at its marginal
cost, normalized to zero.
3are usually in favor of rescuing airlines, creating barriers to exit and soft budget constraints (the
government does not allow ﬁrms to fail). Thus air transport is in general characterized by a
heavily regulated environment with soft budget constraints (government subsidies). Even when
the degree of deregulation increases, the attribution of slots in the airports tends to maintain
market power of the national leader. Finally, in spite of the attempts to make the market more
competitive in the last years we have assisted to an increase of concentration at the EU level,
with important mergers such as British Airways-Iberia or Airfrance-KLM. The market appears
to be concentrated at the European level. This calls for public intervention in order to reduce
distortion related to market power.
The present work studies of the optimal regulation of national ﬁrms in a common market. In
a common market, the regulation of the former monopoly becomes regulation of the “national
champion”. We adopt a model of quantity regulation ` a la Baron and Myerson (1982). Each reg-
ulator sets the quantity produced by the national ﬁrm screening across types through a menu of
contracts setting the quantity and a lump sum transfer. Quantities are chosen simultaneously.
The presence of competition in the integrated market aﬀects the contract between the regulator
and the national ﬁrm. The main results are the following. Under complete information, when
the cost of public funds is positive, competition is welfare enhancing if and only if the variable
costs of the two ﬁrms are diﬀerent enough. In this case, the high cost country beneﬁts from
price reduction and the low cost country from export revenues. When the costs are close, the
(negative) public ﬁnance eﬀect prevails. Competition is not very beneﬁcial to consumers (small
price eﬀect) and it harms the national ﬁrm, and hence tax payers, through business stealing. At
the non cooperative solution, the subsidy paid by at least one government increases (or the tax
revenue decreases). The subsidy to the relatively ineﬃcient national ﬁrm is a way to counterbal-
ance the market power of the foreign provider. The welfare eﬀects are robust and do not depend
on the hypothesis of complete information. However, under asymmetric information, market
integration has an additional impact on the seeking behavior of the regulated ﬁrm. We show
that cost correlation is crucial to determine the impact of competition on the rents captured
by regulated ﬁrm. If shocks are uncorrelated, the rent increases at least for low cost types. If
correlation is high, the rent generally decreases, except possibly for very ineﬃcient types.
Once we have shown the potential welfare reducing eﬀect of market integration, we consider the
possibility of cooperation between regulators. In a progress of regional integration, regulators
can try to achieve collective gains. As a benchmark, we ﬁrst look to the global maximizing
solution. This is the utilitarian solution which maximizes global welfare as given by the sum
of the two national welfare. At this solution the country with the less eﬃcient technology is in
general a loser of the integration process, even if its own consumers enjoy a lower price. For
this reason the eﬃcient solution cannot emerge in a non cooperative framework without side
transfers.
4Each decentralized cooperative solution has to pay back the negative impact of business stealing
on public ﬁnance and the costs related to restructuring. This idea that it could be necessary to
sustain the losers of the liberalization process is consistent, for instance, with the practical ex-
perience of the introduction of the National Competition Policy (NCP) in Australia. NCP was
introduced in 1995: at the time, the government commissioned a public enquiry on the impact
of the new Policy on the diﬀerent communities and social groups. This was explicitly aimed
to evaluate the need for structural adjustment policies towards the losers of the liberalization
process.
In the context of the European Union, the Structural Funds are the instrument used to re-
duce disparity in development and in particular “developing infrastructure, (...) targeting the
development of trans-European networks in the area of transport, telecommunications and en-
ergy” (EC 1260/99). Our result suggests that cooperation in the form of transfers should be
used in order to provide funding for infrastructure and restructuring policies. In the absence of
these resources, it is reasonable to expect countries to overprotect national ﬁrms. Cooperation
with transfers may avoid other less desirable form of subsidies (state aids to ineﬃcient national
producers).
1.1 Related literature
The literature concerning the interactions between regulation and market integration is not
very developed. Brainard and Martimort (1996, 1997) analyze trade policies in an integrated
market. These papers focuses on the strategic eﬀect of export subsidies, under asymmetric
information between the regulator and the national ﬁrm. Governments pay subsidies to national
ﬁrms competing in a third country. Under asymmetric information, the optimal policy stresses a
trade oﬀ between strengthening the position of the national ﬁrm and minimizing the information
rent, which is socially costly. The interaction of regulatory policies reduces the cost of the
information rent. The consumers in the home market are unaﬀected, except for the fact that
rent seeking behavior of the regulated ﬁrm is not desirable due to the existence of a positive cost
of public funds. In this kind of models, contrary to what happens in regulation models, market
power is not detrimental to consumer welfare, since it is exerted only on foreign consumers.
Combes, Caillaud, and Jullien (1997) develop Brainard and Martimort’s framework adding to
the problem domestic production and national consumers. They use a common market model,
in which states may subsidize domestic producers. The regulatory instrument is a quantity
subsidy (associated with a lump sum tax on proﬁts). Following the approach of Brainard and
Martimort, they look at the strategic eﬀect of subsidy policies and ﬁnd that it is optimal to allow
for subsidies in this kind of market (as opposed to the general rule which prevents state aids to
ﬁrms). They don’t consider the ﬁscal eﬀect of competition, which arises whenever the public
funds are costly. With no budget constraint for the government, in their case market integration
5is always welfare improving (for both countries). However, the public ﬁnance aspect of monopoly
regulation is an important one. Traditionally, monopoly Ramsey pricing has constituted a way
to raise funds in order to cover ﬁxed costs or subsidize consumption of less favored groups
of consumers. As Armstrong and Sappington (2005) notice, competition can “complicate the
regulatory policy undermining preferred tax structures”. Similarly, Laﬀont and Tirole (2000),
discussing pro-competitive reforms in telecommunications, argue that competition, limiting the
scope for cross subsidies, may induce an increase in the transfers paid to the industry. When
other sources of taxation are distortive or limited by budget concerns, this can induce relevant
deadweight losses. Adding a positive cost of public funds we obtain strikingly diﬀerent results
in the welfare analysis with respect to the existing literature.
Another approach to the problem of regulation in integrated markets, is given in Calzolari
(2004) Calzolari and Scarpa (2007). The former looks at the interaction between the policies
of diﬀerent regulators. In this model, there is only one multinational ﬁrm operating in two
diﬀerent countries. The paper deals with the capacity of multinational ﬁrm to beneﬁts from lack
of coordination of the regulators of diﬀerent countries. In contrast, we look at the interaction
between regulators of diﬀerent national ﬁrms which compete in a common market. Calzolari
and Scarpa (2007) considers the optimal regulation of a ﬁrm which is a monopoly at home but
competes abroad with a foreign ﬁrm. It is a model of regulation with transfers, but public funds
are not costly. For this reason, if the marginal costs are constant (no externality of the foreign
production of the regulated ﬁrm on production for the internal market), the pricing rule in the
regulated market does not change with competition. The regulatory policy is aﬀected only if
there are economies (or diseconomies) of scale. Interestingly, the model shows that allowing a
private ﬁrm to operate in a foreign market increases the price distortion related to asymmetric
information. As the ﬁrm also operated in the foreign market, it can earn an additional rent
on foreign activities. This model does not consider the case in which the regulator has to deal
with entry of a foreign operator in the home market. Yet economic integration is a process of
reciprocal opening of the market to foreign competitors. Adding this aspect to the picture, we
give diﬀerent insights on the impact of market integration and in particular on the behavior of
the information rent.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is presented. Section 3 analyzes
the case of complete information: it characterizes the equilibrium of the model and the impact
of market integration on welfare. Section 4 considers the case of asymmetric information. In
Section 5 we present the global maximizing solution, which would be imposed by a welfare
maximizing supranational regulator. We also show how this globally eﬃcient solution can be
obtained as a decentralized cooperative solution through Nash-Bargaining between regulators.
6Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries, i ∈ {1,2}. The demand in each country is given by:
qi = ϕi(d − p)
Where ϕi the size of country i and p the price.4 The slope and the intercept of the demand
function are the same in the two countries, but we allow for countries of diﬀerent size. ϕi can be
interpreted as the size of the country in terms of population and/or the level of development. In
fact, demand in sectors such as electricity, telecommunication, transport, postal services has not
the same characteristic in developed and less developed countries. Regulator i maximizes the
welfare of country i, given by the sum of consumer surplus and the proﬁt of the national ﬁrm.
The presence of a positive λi captures the idea that public funds are raised through distortive
taxation (in this sense, λi can be interpreted as the shadow price of the government budget
constraint). Paying a positive subsidy to a regulated ﬁrm in order to expand production creates
distortions in other sectors. Conversely, when the transfer is negative (tax on proﬁts), it helps to
reduce distortive taxation elsewhere. Typically, the revenues of the regulated ﬁrms in proﬁtable
segments are used to cross subsidize network expansion, public investment or subsidized access
in non proﬁtable segments. The assumption of costly public funds is a way of capturing the
general equilibrium eﬀects of sectoral intervention: raising revenue incurs administrative costs
or creates distortions elsewhere in the economy.
2.1 Closed economy
As a benchmark, we consider the closed economy case. We use a standard monopoly regulation
framework ` a la Baron and Myerson (1982). The regulator maximizes the expected welfare under
close economy, WC
i , subject to the participation and incentive constraints of the ﬁrm. Welfare
is given by:
WC
i = S(q) − p(q) q − (1 + λi) t + Πi (1)
The participation constraint takes the form:
Πi = t + (d −
qi
ϕi
− θi)qi + Ui ≥ 0
4This speciﬁcation allows to obtain simple analytical expressions for the quantities, price and welfare. The
results can be extended to more general demand functions.
7Where θi is the constant marginal cost of ﬁrm i. The underlying assumption is that ﬁrms
have a constant marginal cost θi. 5 We can assume they also sustain a ﬁxed cost K, which
measures the economies of scale in the industry. This cost is considered as sunk and does not
enter the participation constraint of the ﬁrms. Ui is the information rent left to the ﬁrm under
the optimal contract. Under asymmetric information, regulators do not observe the cost of the
regulated ﬁrm and they leave some rent to the ﬁrm in order to maintain incentives.
We consider a direct revelation mechanism in which ﬁrm i reports its cost and Regulator i oﬀers
a menu of contracts {qi(θi),t(θi)} to ﬁrm i (the revelation principle assures this is without loss
of generality). The regulator maximizes expected welfare under participation and incentive
compatibility (truthful revelation) constraints of the ﬁrm. The solution of this problem is
standard (Baron and Myerson, 1982; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993).
We deﬁne the virtual cost of ﬁrm i as:
θv
i = θi + γi
Where γi is measure the distortion related to asymmetric information. Due to asymmetric
information, the managers of the ﬁrm are able to inﬂate the report on the cost and get some
information rent.
Assumption 1 The marginal cost θi follows a cumulative distribution function F(θi), i ∈
{1,2}, on the support [θ,θ]. The distribution is known by the regulator.






Under Assumption 1 and taking into account (2), at the optimal contract γi takes the
following form:








f(θi), under asymmetric information.
To avoid bunching, we make the following assumption, which assures that the solution is mono-
tone in θi:
Assumption 2 (Monotone hazard rate property) The hazard rate
F(θi)
f(θi) is non decreasing in θi.
The optimal price and quantity are a function of the virtual cost θv
i .
5In our linear speciﬁcation, expanding or reducing production in response to market integration has no impact
on the unit cost. The eﬀects of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the marginal cost are left to further research.
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λi d + θv
i (1 + λi)
1 + 2λi




When public funds are not costly (i.e. λ = 0), the regulator maximizes consumer gross surplus
net of production cost. The result is marginal cost pricing at the virtual cost. When λi > 0 the













i )(1+λi) . Under complete information, this corresponds to a Ramsey tariﬀ, which
represents the ﬁrst best solution. Under asymmetric information, there is a downward distortion
of the quantity for all types except the most eﬃcient. The regulated monopoly price is above
marginal cost. This means that the equilibrium t is negative (lump sum tax) and it helps
to repay the ﬁxed costs or reduce distortions in other sectors of the economy (through cross
subsidies). Total welfare is obtained by replacing the optimal price and quantity in equation
(1). In the following Section we compare this level of welfare with the one obtained in the case
of market integration.
2.2 Common market
We now suppose that the market is open. For simplicity, we take a perfectly integrated market
in which demand is given by:
p = d −
q1 + q2
ϕ1 + ϕ2
This assumption turns out not to be crucial for the results. Perfect market integration avoid
corner solutions. However, the results are robust when considering a segmented market of
two countries with independent demands and nonzero transportation costs: this alternative
speciﬁcation gives qualitatively similar results (details are available on request to the author).6
6Another simpliﬁcations is that we are assuming that expanding production in order to cover part of the
foreign market does not change the cost structure of the ﬁrms. This is equivalent to assuming that ﬁrms can
expand production to the foreign market at a small (ﬁxed) cost, here normalized to zero. In the case of decreasing
returns to scale, the impact of integration would be of the same nature, though smaller in magnitude.
9Each of the two regulators maximizes home welfare. Regulator i maximizes the surplus of

























qi − λiti (4)
where
ϕi
ϕi+ϕj is the share of country i on total demand. Regulator i maximizes the expected
welfare of country i. The participation constraint takes the form:
Πi = ti + (d −
qi + qj
ϕi + ϕj
− θi)qi ≥ 0
In this model, we do not allow the regulator of country i to contract with ﬁrm j. This is
equivalent to assuming that there is incomplete regulation in each jurisdiction. For simplicity,
one can think to the case in which the national ﬁrm is public. Even in the case of privatized
ﬁrms, asymmetric regulation is used in practice in many liberalized market and have been
already analyzed in the literature.7 Without loss of generality, we adopt the following notation:
Assumption 4 ϕ1 + ϕ2 = 2, ϕ1 = x, ϕ2 = 2 − x, 0 < x < 2
In the symmetric case x = 1. In the asymmetric case, x > 1 means that country 1 is the bigger
one.
3 Common market under complete information
In this section we consider the case of complete information (i.e. γi ≡ 0, θv
i = θi). Regulator
i maximizes national welfare under the participation constraint of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst order
condition of the problem is:
d(1 + λi) − d
x
2










We start studying the symmetric case (i.e. λ1 = λ2 = λ and x = 1), which gives all the main
insights of the model. Afterwards, we assess the impact of asymmetries (heterogeneity between
countries).
3.1 The symmetric case
We derive the the optimal quantities and price in the symmetric case. They are given by:
qO
i =
2d(1 + λ) − θi(3 + 4λ) + θj(1 + 2λ)
2 + 3λ
, i,j ∈ {1,2}, i  = j (5)
pO =
(θ1 + θ2)(1 + λ) + d λ
2 + 3λ
7See for instance Caillaud (1990); Biglaiser and Ma (1995).
10For any level of λ, the lowest cost ﬁrm has the largest market share. When λ = 0, the quantity
produced by ﬁrm i is reduced with respect to closed economy whenever the foreign ﬁrm is more
eﬃcient (θj ≤ θi). In this case, the former monopoly leave some space to the more eﬃcient
competitor to let consumers enjoy lower prices. If λ > 0, leaving market shares to the competitor
make it more diﬃcult to ﬁnance distortive taxation (reducing net proﬁts of ﬁrm i). Regulator i
is willing to reduce the business stealing eﬀect caused by competition with the foreign ﬁrm and
quantity is reduced less often. In particular, the quantity produced by ﬁrm i decreases with
respect to a closed economy if and only if:
θj <
θi [1 + 5λ (1 + λ)] − [dλ (1 + λ)]
(1 + 2λ)
2 < θi, ∀λ > 0
The ﬁscal eﬀect related to the cost of public funds can induce the regulator to expand the
quantity produced when confronted with a more eﬃcient foreign competitor in order to reduce
the scale of entry of the foreign ﬁrm. From the point of view of the national market, when λ > 0
“entry” takes place if and only if the foreign ﬁrm is strictly more eﬃcient than the national
producer. Similarly, the behavior of the price is closely related to the value of the cost of public
funds. When λ = 0 the price is equal to the average marginal cost. Then, compared to the
closed economy case, price is higher for the low cost country and smaller for the high cost one.
The less eﬃcient country ﬁnances the losses of its ﬁrm in order to expand the total quantity
and reduce the price. When λ > 0 the price may decrease even if the competitor is less eﬃcient
than the domestic ﬁrm. In particular, this is the case whenever:
θ1 < θ2 <
θ1(1 + λ) + λd
1 + 2λ
In addition, looking at consumer surplus, some conclusions can be drawn. For θ2 >
θ1(1+λ)+λd
1+2λ
the price in the integrated market lays in between the prices in the separated economies. This
means that the price may increase for consumers located in the country with the more eﬃcient
technology. In this case, consumers would oppose market integration, while the national ﬁrm
gains from it. On the contrary, in the less eﬃcient country consumer would enjoy a lower
price, but the national ﬁrm and thus tax-payers loose from integration. Market integration
has distributive eﬀects and may generate winners and loser in both countries. For this reason
consumers may oppose market integration even in countries in which total welfare increases
with integration. Conversely, a welfare maximizer regulator would promote market integration
in cases in which consumers loose from it.
The net welfare eﬀect of market integration is more diﬃcult to asses. When a ﬁrm is relatively
eﬃcient, it gains form market opening, due to export proﬁts. On the other hand, if λ is positive
and the diﬀerence in marginal cost is small, the negative ﬁscal eﬀect outweighs the eﬃciency
gain.
11Proposition 1 Under complete information, for λ = 0, market integration increases welfare in
both countries. For any λ strictly positive, market integration increases welfare in both countries
if and only if the diﬀerence in the marginal costs is large enough.
Proof: Let ∆W = WO
i − WC
i be the welfare gain of country i going from closed economy to
market integration. Market integration is preferred to autarchy whenever ∆W ≥ 0, or:
θi − θj ≥
λ(d − θj)[B(λ) + C(λ)]
D(λ)
(6)
θi − θj ≤
λ(d − θj)[B(λ) − C(λ)]
D(λ)
(7)
Where B(λ) = 3+λ(9+7λ), C(λ) = (2+3λ)
 
(1 + 2λ)(3 + 4λ), D(λ) = 3+λ(19+λ(37+23λ)).
If λ = 0, the RHS of both inequalities are equal to zero and market integration is always welfare
improving with respect to a closed economy. If λ > 0,the RHS of inequality (6) is always
positive under Assumption 3. Thus the inequality is satisﬁed if the relative ineﬃciency of ﬁrm
i is big enough. Conversely, the RHS of inequality (7) is always negative. Then the inequality
is satisﬁed if the relative eﬃciency of ﬁrm i is big enough. We conclude that, when the cost of
public funds is positive, countries mutually beneﬁt from market integration if and only if the
cost diﬀerential is big enough.
The public ﬁnance eﬀect can be important in practice, since government are not free to correct
market distortions at no cost and the cost of public funds is in general positive (estimated
around 0.3 in developed countries and larger for developing ones, see for instance Snow and
Warren, 1996). Whenever they devote funds to an industry to promote universal service or to
reduce the eﬀects of monopoly power, they have to raise these fund trough distortive taxation
or divert funds from other socially valuable activities. Competition, through business stealing,
reduces the capability of performing taxation by regulation. Nevertheless, we have shown that
competition can be beneﬁcial for two reasons:
1. If the foreign ﬁrm is signiﬁcatively less eﬃcient than the national ﬁrm, the beneﬁts from
increased proﬁt (due to the possibility of serving also foreign demand) increase total
welfare.
2. If the foreign ﬁrm is signiﬁcatively more eﬃcient than the national ﬁrm, the ineﬃcient
country can beneﬁt from the reduction in price caused by competition, which enhances
consumer welfare.
In order to illustrate the result given in Proposition 1, we adopt the following notation: the
cost diﬀerence between the two producers is expressed as ∆ = θj − θi. If ∆ > 0, country i
has the more eﬃcient technology. When λ = 0, an increase in ∆ increases the welfare gains
12identically in the low cost and high cost country. The result is driven by the eﬃciency gains
related to the reallocation of production among the two countries. When public funds are not
costly, the regulators can prevent ineﬃcient business stealing expanding the production of the
national ﬁrm: this has no cost because the information rent is not an issue in this case (if public
funds are not costly, a subsidy to the regulated ﬁrm is a pure transfer and has no impact on
welfare, both under complete and asymmetric information). When λ > 0, the welfare gains
shift downwards and to the left. As a result, the intercept (corresponding to ∆ = 0) is negative,
which means that if θ1 = θ2 both countries loose from integration. For ∆  = 0 the welfare
gains of the two countries are asymmetric. For the most eﬃcient one (∆ > 0) the gains are
strictly increasing. For the less eﬃcient (∆ < 0) they have U-shape. The welfare gains are ﬁrst
decreasing and then increasing. Eventually, for |∆| big enough, the welfare gains are positive
in both countries. Figure 1 illustrates the welfare gains for λ = 0 and λ > 0 respectively.8
Figure 1: Welfare Gains: WO
1 − WC





Figure 3.1 shows the value of the cost parameters for which the diﬀerence between welfare in
the integrated market WO is lower than the one under closed economy WC. This happens
whenever θi ≥ θj and θi ≃ θj. This result suggests that countries with big cost diﬀerences
should be in favor of market integration, which is mutually beneﬁcial. One possible example is
the integration of electricity markets between France (low cost region) and neighbor countries
(Italy, Spain). The cost of production is very diﬀerent between countries and both can beneﬁt
from market integration.9
8The results illustrated in the ﬁgure hold for all λ > 0, as one can easily verify analytically.
9For the Nord Pool the situation is apparently diﬀerent, since there is not a big diﬀerence in generation costs,
at least on average. Nevertheless, as Ward, Allen and Davis (2002) notice, the success of the Pool is strictly
related to the complementarity of fuel sources: the signiﬁcant hydro capacity of Norway (100 % ) and Sweden
(50 %) can, in wet years, provide cheap electricity beneﬁcial to other markets; the signiﬁcant thermal capacity of
Denmark (85 %) and Finland (55 %) can provide “dry-year” reserve for the hydro countries.
133.2 Asymmetries between countries
We turn now to the asymmetric case. The impact of asymmetries is summarized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 2 Assume λ1 = λ2 = λ and, without loss of generality, let country 1 be the bigger
one (i.e x > 1). The result in Proposition 1 holds. Moreover, increasing asymmetry from x = 1,






The smaller country gains more (or looses less) from market integration.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
As in Combes, Caillaud, and Jullien (1997) the gains from trade are larger for the country with
the smallest market. We now study the case of asymmetric cost of public funds:
Proposition 3 Let x = 1 and consider a local increase in λi, which implies that country
i’s tax system becomes relatively ineﬃcient. By continuity, the result in Proposition 1 holds.
Moreover, there exist a threshold value ˜ θ ≤ θj such that, for all θi > ˜ θ, gains form trade in









< 0, ∀θ1 > ˜ θ
Proof: see Appendix 2.
The result of Proposition 3 helps to qualify the result obtained in Proposition 2. The gains
from economic integration decrease with the size of the country but generally increase with
the relative eﬃciency of the public sector. If the smaller economy is a less developed one,
with tighter budget constraint (here summarized by a large cost of public funds) and not very
eﬃcient technology (θ1 > ˜ θ), this reduces its gains. The problem of raising funds to cover
ﬁxed investment is particularly severe in countries characterized by ineﬃcient tax systems.
As Laﬀont, 2005 explains discussing regulatory reforms in developing countries, taxation by
regulation can play an important role in these countries. For this reason, market opening may
be harmful to countries characterized by severe budget constraints if it is not accompanied by
some other ﬁscal policy which can compensate for the loss of revenue of the national ﬁrms.
4 The impact of asymmetric information
In many markets the ﬁrms have private information about production costs. For this reason,
second best regulation requires the payment of an information rent to the ﬁrms. In this context,
14market integration and competition could constitute an instrument to improve the performance
of regulated ﬁrms by reducing the burden of the rents paid by society to the regulated monop-
olies. As this section shows, this is not always the case. We make the assumption, usual in
the regulation literature, that the distribution of θi is common knowledge. The realization of
the costs, on the contrary, is private information of the ﬁrms. For simplicity, we assume that
each ﬁrm is informed about the eﬀect of the shocks on the two marginal costs.10 The incentive
compatibility constraint is modiﬁed. If costs are correlated, overstating its cost the domestic
ﬁrm knows that the competitor is more eﬃcient than it is believed by the regulator. Mimicking
a higher cost the national ﬁrm is confronted with a higher anticipated response of the competi-
tor. For this reason, the gains from mimicking a high cost are reduced. We assume that the
national regulator and the national ﬁrm cannot write contracts contingent on the realization of
foreign variables. This can depend on the fact that foreign variables are not veriﬁable.11 For
simplicity, we restrict the attention to the symmetric case. The extension to asymmetry can be
obtained with the same technique adopted for the case of complete information illustrated in




























The ﬁrst term in the RHS is equal to 0 (Cournot model). Moreover, the term dθj
dθi
is greater than
0 in case of positive correlation. In this case, the slope of the information rent will be reduced
and the price is closer to eﬃciency. Consumers beneﬁt from this indirect eﬀect of competition,
even if no explicit benchmark regulation is performed.
The regulator maximizes the expected welfare:
WAI
i = Eθ1,θ2 [S(q) − p(q) q − (1 + λi) t + Πi]
subject to the constraints:
10This particular assumption does not inﬂuence the result. If the cost of the competitor was not known, the
reaction function of the ﬁrm will depend on the expectation.
11If foreign variables were veriﬁable, competition could also open the possibility of yardstick competition. In
this case, the regulator could write contracts contingent on the performance of the foreign ﬁrm. In this paper,
we don’t consider this possibility. However, in case of partial cost correlation, all the qualitative results would
be preserved.
15Πi = t + (d −
qi + qj
2
− θi)qi + Ui ≥ 0



















The ﬁrst order condition of this problem is:
Eθj|θi [4(d − θv
i ) − qi(3 + 4λi) − qj(1 + 2λi)] = 0 (9)
Where we have:
















i − (1 + 2λi)qj]
3 + 4λ
In order to get explicit results, we consider the two limit cases of uncorrelated costs and perfect
correlation. These are limit cases which approximate the more general cases of high or low
correlation between the variable production costs.
4.1 Uncorrelated costs
We start considering the case of uncorrelated marginal costs. More precisely, we assume that
costs are distributed over the same support and have equal mean, but they are subject to id-
iosyncratic shocks. In this case, market opening has no direct impact on the rent extraction
problem. In fact, with uncorrelated shocks,
∂qj
∂θi = 0. The slope of the information rent is unaf-
fected and still depends on the hazard rate of the characteristic of the regulated ﬁrm. However,
the quantity is not the same under complete and asymmetric information. In particular, the
presence of a competitor allows the regulator to reduce the quantity of the regulated ﬁrm with
a lower impact on the price with respect to monopoly (because the quantity produced by the
competitor is not aﬀected by a reduction of the regulated quantity). This may reduce the social




2(1 + λ)[d(3 + 4λ) − 2θv
i (2 + 3λ) + Eθv(1 + 2λ)]








jdF(θj) is the expected virtual cost in the case of no correla-
tion. The price is given by





When λ = 0 (and thus θv
i = θi), the price is equal to:
pAI|λ=0 =
2(θ1 + θ2) − EΘ θ
3
In this case, the expected price EΘP is equal to the expected marginal cost Eθv. For λ > 0,










12(1 + λ)(1 + 2λ)
(2 + 3λ)(3 + 4λ)
Eθv
The results are similar to the one obtained in Section 3 for the case of complete information.
They hold here for the expected price. When λ increases from zero, the regulators suﬀer from
the adverse ﬁscal eﬀect, as under complete information. The slope of the rent is not aﬀected by
the presence of competition, due to the hypothesis of independence of the marginal costs. The
total rent can increase or decrease, depending on the behavior of the optimal quantity. In order
to solve analytically for the value of the information rent, we make the following Assumption.
Assumption 5 The common marginal cost θ is uniformly distributed over the interval [θ,θ].
The following result holds:
Proposition 4 Under asymmetric information and uncorrelated marginal costs distributed as
in Assumption 5, the information rent of ﬁrm i decreases if and only if:
θi ≥
λ(3 + 4λ)[2d(1 + λ) − (θ + 2λ)] + 2θ(1 + 3λ(2 + λ(5 + 4λ)))
(1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ)(1 + 4λ)
(11)
Proof: see Appendix 4.
When λ = 0, the rent decreases for each θi. When λ is strictly positive, the larger is d the more
diﬃcult is to satisfy inequality (11). When d is large enough (i.e. d ≥ ˜ d =
(1+2λ)2θ+λθ(3+4λ)
λ(1+λ)(3+4λ) ),
the inequality is never satisﬁed and the information rent increases for all types. For d small, the
rent increases for low θi and decreases for high θi. The minimal admissible value of d satisfying
Assumption 3 is d = θ
v
. When d is closed to this minimal value, the ex ante technological
uncertainty (related to the variance of θi) is large. When the national ﬁrm is very ineﬃcient,
the regulator expects the competitor to be relatively eﬃcient. The quantity qi is reduced and
the information rent decreases. On the contrary, when ﬁrm i is very eﬃcient, its production is
increased with respect to monopoly and thus the rent is increased. As in Calzolari and Scarpa
(2007), a rent is also paid on the foreign activity and the burden of the information rent is
17larger when the ﬁrm competes in the integrated market. In Figure 4.1 the information rent
under closed and open economy is represented for the case of d large (i.e. d > ˜ d) and small (i.e.
d = θ
v
) respectively. The dotted line represents the rent under closed economy and the solid
line the information rent in the case of an integrated market.
Figure 2: The Information Rent: Uncorrelated Costs.
Computing now the welfare eﬀect of market integration in the case of uncorrelated marginal
costs, we ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 5 Under asymmetric information and uncorrelated marginal costs, market inte-
gration decreases welfare for θi = θv
j. Welfare increases in both countries if and only if |θi −θv
j|
is big enough.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The diﬀerence in welfare is negative whenever the diﬀerence between the national marginal
cost and the foreign virtual cost is small. As in the case of complete information, market
integration increase welfare only in the case in which the two technologies are diﬀerent enough.
We now turn to the case of correlation between marginal costs.
4.2 Perfectly correlated costs
We consider the opposite limit case of perfect correlation θi = θj = θ. We have:










This is the case in which the rent reducing impact of competition is maximized. In fact, when
costs are perfectly correlated, the regulated ﬁrm anticipates that, overstating its cost, it will
compete with a foreign ﬁrm which is more eﬃcient than expected by the national regulator.
The reaction of the competitor reduce the gains form overstating the cost and then the slope of
the information rent. Also in this case, we solve for the case of θ distributed as in Assumption
5. The ﬁrst order condition becomes:
2d(1 + λ) − 2θ(1 + 2λ) − λ(θ − θ)˙ q + 2λθ − q(2 + 3λ) = 0
This diﬀerential equation has a linear solution of the form:
q =
2d(1 + λ) − θ(2 + 3λ) + λθ
2 + 3λ
(12)
so that ˙ q = −1.
The following result holds.
Proposition 6 Under asymmetric information and perfectly correlated marginal costs dis-
tributed as in Assumption 5, the information rent of ﬁrm i decreases if and only if:
θ ≤
4d(1 + λ)2 − (1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ)θ + (1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ)θ
(1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ)
(13)
Proof: see Appendix 4.
When λ = 0, the rent decreases for each θi. When λ is strictly positive, the larger is d the
easier is to satisfy inequality (13). For d ≥ ˜ d′ =
(θ+θ)(1+2λ)(2+3λ)−2λ(3+4λ)θ
4(1+λ)2 , the inequality is
always satisﬁed and the rent decreases for all types. When d is small (i.e. θ/d is large), it is the
rent of the least eﬃcient types which possibly increases with respect to monopoly. The reason
is the following. When shocks are perfectly correlated, the regulator cannot exploit a sampling
eﬀect. However, competition, reducing the slope of the information rent, allows to reduce the
quantity distortion required for maintaining incentives. In the case of very ineﬃcient types, for
which under monopoly the downward distortion of the second best quantity is large, the rent
can increase with respect to regulated monopoly.
Figure 4.2 shows the diﬀerence in the information rent under closed and open economy for d
large (i.e. d ≥ ˜ d′) and small (i.e. d = θ
v
) respectively. The dotted line represents the rent under
closed economy and the solid line the information rent in the case of an integrated market.
Computing the diﬀerence between welfare in a closed economy and under market integration
we obtain the result illustrated in the following Proposition.
19Figure 3: The information rent: correlated costs.
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 5, for λ = 0 welfare in the two countries is not aﬀected by
integration. For λ > 0, d > θ + (θ − θ)3+5λ
1+λ there always exists a value ˆ θ ∈ (θ,θ) such that
∀θ > ˆ θ closed economy is preferred to market integration. For d < θ+(θ−θ)3+5λ
1+λ welfare always
increases with integration.
Proof: see Appendix 4.
The result is illustrated in Figure 4.2 for λ > 0 and d > θ + (θ − θ)3+5λ
1+λ .
The intuition for this result is that, for the most eﬃcient types, the rent reducing eﬀect of
competition is very important and induces and increase in total welfare. For the least eﬃcient
types, the business stealing eﬀect prevails. The necessary condition d > θ + (θ − θ)3+5λ
1+λ states
that this negative eﬀect occurs when demand is steep and the ex ante technological risk θ/d is
low.
4.3 Concluding remarks on the impact of asymmetric information
Competition is in general thought to put constraints on the regulated ﬁrm and limit its capability
of capturing information rents. The analysis above show that this is not always the case and the
direction of the eﬀect depends crucially on the stochastic structure considered. When shocks
are uncorrelated, the information rent tends to increase, at least for the more eﬃcient types.
On the contrary, with high correlation, the rent generally decreases (though it may increase for
very ineﬃcient ﬁrms). Both scenarios could be empirically relevant, depending on the industry
20Figure 4: Min [WNC − WM,0]: correlated costs.
considered. Variations of the information rent would transmit to the transfer paid to the
regulated ﬁrm (or the tax extracted). When the rent is reduced, the transfer decreases and this
has an additional impact on total welfare increases. Conversely, an increase in the rent has an
adverse impact on the welfare gains as compared to the case complete information. The analysis
above shows that, when considering the net impact of market integration on total welfare, the
main insights of the basic model are preserved under asymmetric information. In particular,
when the costs are not correlated all the qualitative results of Section 5 apply. When correlation
is high, market integration is more valuable. Still, there may exist values of the parameters for
which a closed market is preferred to market integration.
5 Cooperation between regulators
We are now interested in the possibility of solving the problem arising from the lack of coordi-
nation between the the two regulators. The welfare reducing eﬀect of market opening is related
to the fact that each regulator does not take into account the impact of its policy on foreign
consumer and taxpayers. When considering a process of regional market integration, we can
imagine that some cooperation will emerge among regulators. In fact, member countries seem
concerned with the opportunity of introducing some form of harmonization of the domestic
policies. In such a situation, considering only the Nash-Cournot solution is restrictive, since it
rules out any possible role for cooperation between institutions.
21We now consider the case of cooperation between countries. As a ﬁrst step we focus on the
the solution chosen by a global welfare maximizing social planner. The supranational social
planner has no national preferences and maximizes the total welfare of the integrated market.
This theoretical benchmark describes a process of integration in which the two countries are
fully integrated, even on a ﬁscal point of view. For a concrete example one can think to German
reuniﬁcation. The East and West economic systems have been uniﬁed under the same govern-
ment (full uniﬁcation of regulatory bodies and ﬁscal system).
We consider the solution in the complete information case. As we have seen, the results are
qualitatively similar to the case in which there is asymmetry of information but cost are corre-
lated. After characterizing the global optimum, we will move to the decentralized cooperative
equilibrium.
5.1 Global welfare maximizing solution
The supranational utilitarian social planner maximizes the sum of welfare of the two countries.
In this linear model, the global optimum prescribes shut down of the less eﬃcient ﬁrm. Then
the optimal solution has the following characteristics:
• Only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm produces.
• If, without loss of generality, we assume that ﬁrm 1 is the most eﬃcient ﬁrm (θ1 < θ2),
total quantity is equal to:
q∗ = 2 qC
1 (θ1) (14)
Where qC
1 (θ1) is the regulated monopoly quantity of country 1 in the case of closed econ-
omy.
The less eﬃcient ﬁrm shuts down and the more eﬃcient covers all the market. This result arises
because there is not segmentation of demand, no entry costs, constant marginal costs and an
homogeneous products. This simplifying assumption aims to illustrate the fact that productive
eﬃciency induces to reduce the quantity produced by one ﬁrm on eﬃciency grounds (in the
model to zero, but this is just a simpliﬁcation).
Global welfare in the case of coordination is greater than the sum of the two welfare in de-
centralized solution. In fact, both regulators suﬀer from the fact that they take uncoordinated
decision and they could do better sharing the gains form coordination. A supranational welfare
maximizing social planner, would share the surplus generated with production equally among
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2 (15)
22In the global maximization problem a central benevolent government imposes a policy to the
uniﬁed market. This captures somehow the kind of integration which occurred in the case
of the German reuniﬁcation. In the process of reuniﬁcaiton, two regions with an important
productivity gap have been merged under the same government. At the beginning of the
reuniﬁcation process, the physical productivity of East Germany was estimated to be about
1/3 of that in the West (Czarnitzki, 2005). As R¨ oller and Hirchhausen (1996) point out, the
particularity of the East German case was that restructuring and privatization were managed
by the same institution. State aid has accompanied the restructuring process. The provision of
public goods and governmental services were just redistributed within the state sector: eastern
Germany railways and telecommunications became part of the western German counterparts.
As Siegmund (1997) notices, the budget constraint of the privatization agency “could be made
politically soft because mainly Western German taxpayers were paying and will pay for the
losses”.
This framework seems not particularly suitable to describe the EU case, in which each country
has an independent regulator and cooperation has to mediate among the possibly diverging
objective. For this reason, as we show in the following, in the absence of a uniﬁed ﬁscal system,
allowing for transfers between the formerly separated regions is a way to reduce the ineﬃciencies
generated by market integration.
5.2 Decentralized solution: Nash Bargaining
As seen in Section 3, the global welfare maximizing solution does not emerge from the de-
centralized decisions of the two regulators. One of the reasons is that proﬁts are not shared
between countries. Moreover, in general countries cannot commit ex ante to a certain proﬁle of
production. In this case, the globally eﬃcient solution has to rely on ex post bargaining between
the two countries. In the real world, there is in general no court to punish deviation from an
agreement of this kind. An important exception for the case of the EU is agriculture, where
agreement on “quotas” of production are enforced with ﬁnes to producers. This is indeed an
exception, in other markets it is diﬃcult to imagine the creation of a EU policy with quotas of
production for telecommunications, transport or energy. Nevertheless, regulators can cooperate
in order to reduce the negative impact of each other policies. Our model suggests that they
should do it. To consider this possibility, we compute the cooperative equilibrium in which
countries bargain on the gains from coordination. The global optimum can be obtained as a
cooperative Nash bargaining solution between the two countries. This implies the existence of
side payments between the countries. In particular, one possible decentralized solution is the
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In our symmetric model, this is equivalent to sharing in halves the gains from cooperation.12
WN
i is welfare in country i in the non cooperative solution, T is the transfer from country 1 to
country 2.
Proposition 8 At the cooperative solution, the optimal transfer from country 1 to country 2 is
given by:





where τ is the ﬁscal revenue of country 1 at the global maximizing solution (Equation (15)).
Proof: The expression for T∗ is obtained maximizing the Nash product with respect to T.
The transfer T is equal to the ﬁscal revenue τ reduced by a term proportional to the diﬀer-
ence in the outside option of the two regulators, represented by the Nash-Cournot equilibrium.





2 λ(2 + λ(5 + 3λ)) − (2d − θ1 − θ2)(θ2 − θ1)(1 + 2λ(1 + λ(1 + λ)))
2(1 + 2λ)3(2 + 3λ)
−
(2d − θ2)λθ2(1 + λ)
(1 + 2λ2)
For λ = 0, T∗ is always negative:
T∗|λ=0 = −
(2d − θ1 − θ2) (θ2 − θ1)
4
< 0
When λ = 0, the regulator maximizes net consumer welfare. She just cares about ﬁnding the
cheapest provider (for country 2, the foreign ﬁrm). The problem is that the regulator in the
high cost country cannot control production of the more eﬃcient ﬁrm in order to induce it to
internalize the eﬀect of its policy on the foreign consumers. The regulator is willing to pay a
transfer in order to induce the foreign ﬁrm to increase the production (this transfer is indeed a
substitute for the possibility of paying a subsidy to the foreign ﬁrm for increasing the quantity).
The increase in consumer surplus obtained this way is greater than the one it gets ﬁnancing
losses of an ineﬃcient national ﬁrm (as it happens at the Cournot Nash equilibrium, as shown in
Section 3). For λ > 0, the public ﬁnance eﬀect intervenes. The regulator is not just interested
12In case of asymmetric bargaining power, the gains from cooperation would be shared diﬀerently, but the
qualitative insights are not aﬀected.
24in getting the service at the minimal marginal cost. Raising funds to cover ﬁxed costs or other
public projects becomes important. In this case, T∗ is maximal for θ2 converging to θ1 and it
decreases with an increase in the diﬀerence in the marginal costs. Moreover, the slope of T∗
increases in d (i.e. T∗ becomes less steep when d increases). We have the following result:
Proposition 9 For λ > 0 and d big enough, T∗ is always positive. The most eﬃcient country
has to compensate the less eﬃcient one for renouncing to domestic production. The critical
level of d is:





2λ(1+λ)(2+3λ) > 0 , ∀λ > 0.
The country with the more eﬃcient technology pays a transfer to the less eﬃcient one in
order to pay back some of the damage deriving from restructuring (shutting down the national
ﬁrm) (see Figure 5). This seems to be the more relevant case. Since public funds are costly
and national production is valuable for the regulator, market restructuring which reallocates
production between countries on the basis of eﬃciency has to be accompanied with some transfer
to the countries which suﬀer from restructuring. T∗ is shown in Figure (5) for the case d >
θ2 + (θ2 − θ1)Λ(λ).




We have thus shown that, when the cost of public funds is taken into account, the transfer to






(1 + 2λ)3 −
(2d − θ1 − θ2)(θ2 − θ1)
2(2 + 3λ)2
25That this expression is always positive under Assumption 3 and for all θ2 ≥ θ1. Even in the
presence of the transfer T, the total ﬁscal revenue of the less eﬃcient country (the international
transfer plus the tax to the former national producer)decreases with respect to a closed economy.
For this reason, the burden of transfers for the country with the less eﬃcient technology increases
with market integration. Relying on a more eﬃcient foreign competitor may reduce prices and
increase overall eﬃciency, but it has a negative impact on public ﬁnance.
5.2.1 Alternative speciﬁcation: bargaining on the gains from integration
In the Nash bargaining solution computed in the section above, we have assumed bargaining
on the gains from coordination, taking as given the fact that markets are perfectly integrated.
This describes a situation in which countries have already committed to market integration.
An alternative speciﬁcation could take the closed economy welfare as the non cooperative bench-
mark. In this case we have WN
i = WC
i in the Nash bargaining problem described in Equation
(16). Here we allow countries to bargaining over the gains from integration. This speciﬁcation
ﬁts the case in which countries can stick to statutory monopoly if the have no gains from in-
tegration. One can verify that under this alternative speciﬁcation all the results are preserved.




2 λ(1 + λ) − (2d − θ1 − θ2)(θ2 − θ1)(1 − λ(1 + 2λ))
4(1 + 2λ)2 −
(2d − θ2)λθ2(1 + λ)
(1 + 2λ)2
This transfer T′ is higher than T∗ computed above. In fact we have:
T′ − T∗ =
(2d − θ1 − θ2)(θ2 − θ1)(3 + 5λ)
4(2 + λ(7 − 6λ)
> 0
Then, if countries can oppose integration, the transfer to the least eﬃcient one is bigger than
in the case in which integration is taken as given. This also means that, if countries commit
to share equally the full beneﬁt from integration, the compensation to the country with the
ineﬃcient technology is bigger.
6 Conclusion
The present paper analyzes the interaction between market integration and national regulatory
policies. This constitutes a way to look to the issues arising in contexts such as the Euro-
pean market integration, in which national regulators have to deal with ﬁrms operating in a
supranational market. Adopting a two ﬁrms and two regulators model, we show that market
integration may decrease welfare in one or both countries. Market integration can be welfare
reducing because of its impact on the budget constraint of the regulated ﬁrms (business stealing
eﬀect). The paper also show that the impact of supranational competition on the rent seeking
26behavior of ﬁrms can go both ways, depending crucially on the level of cost correlation and the
degree of ex ante technological risk. The eﬀect of market integration on the agency problem of
the regulator may thus be diﬀerent in diﬀerent industries. At the noncooperative equilibrium,
the level of transfers increases for one or both countries with respect to closed economy. In
particular the optimal regulatory scheme may involve ﬁnancing the operating losses of a na-
tional ineﬃcient producer. This kind of subsidies are optimal from the point of view of national
regulators, although globally ineﬃcient. In the last part of the paper, we show that the globally
eﬃcient allocation of production can be reached in a decentralized framework allowing for Nash
bargaining between the regulators. In this case, side transfers are paid. When the cost of public
funds is an issue, the less eﬃcient country has to be compensated for the loss related to shutting
down the national ﬁrm. The public ﬁnance aspects of regulation is shown to be important to
determine the optimal regulatory policy. It may be necessary to accompany market integration
with transfers to the losers of the integration process harmed by the process of restructuring
triggered by market integration.
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Appendix 1: asymmetric demand
We have γ1 = x, γ2 = 2 − x. We now consider country 1 (the same result holds for country 2,



























Moreover, at the optimal solution:
q1 =
2d(x + λ) + θ2(2 + 2λ − x) − θ1(2 + 4λ + x)
2 + 3λ
q2 =
2d(2 + λ) + θ1(x + 2λ) − θ2(4 + 4λ + x)
2 + 3λ






Substituting these quantities in the welfare function and developing computation, one can verify
that the diﬀerence in welfare WO
1 − WC
1 is bigger than zero iﬀ:
θ1 − θ2 ≥ λ(d − θ2)Z(λ) (17)





4(1+λ)3−x(1+λ(5+λ(11+9λ))) > 0, ∀λ ≥ 0, x ∈ [1,2]






(1 + λ)(α1 d2 + α2 θ2
1 + α3 θ2
2 − α4 dθ1 + α5 dθ2 − α6 θ1 θ2)
2(1 + λ)(2 + 3λ)2 ≡ Φ(d,θ1,θ2,λ)
Where:
α1 = λ2(5 + 9λ),
α2 = 1 + λ(5 + λ(11 + 9λ)),
α3 = 1 + λ(3 + 2λ),
α4 = 2 + λ(14 + 18λ),
α5 = 2λ(1 + 2λ),
α6 = 2 + 8λ(1 + λ).
One can easily verify that for all values of the parameters d, θ2, and λ, Φ(d,θ1,θ2,λ) is a
concave function of θ1, which maximum is attained along the line θ1 =
dλ(1+7λ+9λ2)+θ2(1+2λ)2
1+5λ+11λ2+9λ3 .
This maximum value is given by:
Φmax = −
(d − θ2)λ2(1 + λ)
1 + 5λ + 11λ2 + 9λ3 < 0, ∀d ≥ θ2,λ > 0
29Appendix 2: asymmetric λ
We consider the case λi  = λj. In this case, what is relevant is not the diﬀerence in the marginal
costs, but the diﬀerence in the closed economy Ramsey benchmark, which takes into account
the cost of public funds in the country.
The reaction function of regulator i depend only λi
4d(1 + λi) − (3 + 4λi)qi − (1 + 2λi)qj − 4θi = 0 i  = j
The equilibrium quantities are computed from the system if the two ﬁrst order condition:
qi =
d(2 + λi + 3λj + 2λiλj + 2λiλj) − (1 + λi)(3 + 4λj)θi + (1 + 2λi)(1 + λj)θj
4 + 5(λi + λj) + 6λiλj
Substituting the quantities in the welfare function and developing computations we obtain:
∂ (W O















4 dθi + α′
5 dθj − α′
6 θ1 θ2)




1 = 2λ(5 + λ(24 + λ(40 + λ(25 + 3λ)))),
α′
2 = (11 + 2λ(41 + λ(130 + λ(218 + λ(191 + 69λ))))),
α′
3 = (1 + λ)(1 + 2λ)3(5 + 6λ),
α′
4 = −(16 + λ(31 + 4λ(20 + λ(37 + λ(43 + 21λ))))),
α′
5 = (1 + 2λ)2(6 + λ(27 + 4λ(11 + 6λ))),
α′
6 = (1 + 2λ)2(16 + λ(69 + 4λ(25 + 12λ))).
One can verify that Φ′(d,θi,θj,λ) is negative for:
˜ θ < θi < ˜ ˜ θ
Where:
˜ θ ≡
(β1 − β2)d − θj(β3 − β2)
2(11 + 2λ(41 + λ(130 + λ(218 + λ(191 + 69λ)))))
˜ ˜ θ ≡
(β1 + β2)d − θj(β3 − β2)
2(11 + 2λ(41 + λ(130 + λ(218 + λ(191 + 69λ)))))
and:
β1 = 6 + λ(31 + 4λ(20 + λ(37 + λ(43 + 21λ)))),
β2 = (2 + 3λ)(1 + 2λ)
3
2(9 + 2λ(61 + 4λ(55 + λ(86 + 9λ(7 + 2λ)))))
1
2,
β3 = (1 + 2λ)2(16 + λ(69 + 4λ(25 + 12λ))).
Since for all d > θ2, ˜ ˜ θ > d ≥ θ, the relevant constraint is:
θi > ˜ θ
Moreover, ˜ θ is smaller than θ2 for any d ≥ θ2.
30Appendix 3: uncorrelated costs
The information rent in the case of closed economy (UO
i ) and common market (UC
i ) are com-
puted replacing respectively (10) and (3) in (8) and 2. Solving the inequality UO
i − UC
i ≥ 0
with respect to θi gives the result in Proposition 6.
Substituting for the values of the quantities and the information rents in the welfare functions
(4) and (1) we can compute the value of the diﬀerence in welfare along the line θi = θv
j. One
can show that for λ = 0
WO
i − WC




i )2 ≤ 0 ∀θj
Moreover, when λ > 0, WO
i −WC
i is stricly positive whenever |θi−θj| is large enough. To show









Appendix 4: perfectly correlated costs
The information rent UO
i is computed using 8 and 12. Solving the inequality UO
i −UC
i ≥ 0 with
respect to θ gives the result in Proposition 8.
Substituting for the values of the quantity q(θ) and the information rent in the welfare function
we can compute the value of the diﬀerence in welfare W1 − WM. One can verify that, ∀λ > 0,
W1 − WM > 0 iﬀ:
θ < ˆ θ =





2 − γ4dθ + γ5dθ − γ6θθ
(1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ)
θ > ˆ θ′ =





2 − γ4dθ + γ5dθ − γ6θθ
(1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ)
Where:
γ1 = 2(1 + λ)2(2 + λ + 2λ2),
γ2 = (1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ),
γ3 = λ(6 − λ(3 + 2λ(9 + 8λ))),
γ4 = 4(1 + λ)2(1 + 2λ)(2 + 3λ),
γ5 = 6λ(1 + λ)2(3 + 2λ),
γ6 = 2λ(2 + 3λ)(1 + 2λ)(3 + 4λ).
We have:
ˆ θ < θ and ˆ θ′ > θ iﬀ d < θ or d > θ + (θ − θ)
3 + 5λ
1 + λ
31By Assumption 3, d ≥ θ
v
≥ θ, then a suﬃcient condition for having θ < ˆ θ < θ is d >
θ + (θ − θ)3+5λ
1+λ .
Appendix 5: the cooperative solution




2 λ(2 + λ(5 + 3λ)) − (2d − θ1 − θ2)(θ2 − θ1)(1 + 2λ(1 + λ(1 + λ)))
2(1 + 2λ)3(2 + 3λ)
−
(2d − θ2)λθ2(1 + λ)
(1 + 2λ2)
From this expression, we derive:
T∗|λ=0 =
(2d − θ1 − θ2) (θ1 − θ2)
4
< 0, ∀θ1 < θ2
T∗|θ1=θ2 =
(d − θ2)2λ(1 + λ)




(d − θ2)(1 + 2λ)
(2 + 3λ)2 < 0, ∀λ > 0
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